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In 2014, Washington State used a lottery system to allocate licenses to firms in the newly legalized
retail cannabis industry, generating random variation in how many stores entrepreneurs were able to own.
We observe highly detailed data on all subsequent industry transactions, including prices, wholesale costs,
markups, and product assortments. We find that entrepreneurs who are randomly allocated more store
licenses ultimately earn substantially higher per store profits than do single-store firms, suggesting that
the returns to scale in the mom-and-pop retail sector are quite large. Despite these firms having greater
market power, this increase in profits does not come at the expense of consumers. Rather, retailers
in multi-store chains ultimately charge significantly lower prices and margins and offer greater product
variety. This gap in prices is not initially present but grows substantially over time, as does the difference
in assortment size and profits between stores in multi-store chains and stores operating alone. Using the
full history of outcomes, we track the evolution of firms in this new market and show that multi-store
retailers use an initial advantage in offering larger assortments to position themselves as the low-price,
large-assortment retail option and attract a larger but more price-sensitive set of customers. These
results have implications for the study of retail concentration and mergers, countervailing buyer power,
and consumer search. Our results suggest that policies to help entrepreneurs expand in retail may have
large benefits to both firms and consumers.
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The factors that determine the success or failure of new small businesses have attracted sub-
stantial interest from the academic literature on entrepreneurship and from policymakers interested
in promoting entrepreneurship and small businesses.1 Retail plays an outsized role in this debate
because mom-and-pop retail firms, those with either one or several outlets in a local area, account
for 88% of all retail firms and retail is the 2nd most common occupation for the self-employed.2 This
paper studies several open questions regarding the size and nature of economies of scale for small,
“mom-and-pop” style retailers, the determinants of entrepreneurial success, the effects of retail
concentration on consumers, and the evolution of firm outcomes and strategies in new industries.
We do so using a novel setting where entrepreneurs were randomly allocated different numbers
of retail stores in a new industry. A retail chain’s size or scale both caused and are determined
by its pricing policies, its assortment choices, its managerial quality, its capitalization, its brand
positioning, its set of upstream relationships, its degree of competition with rivals, and so on. As
such, it is particularly difficult to separately identify cause and effect relationships between strategies
and outcomes that are jointly determined in equilibrium. Studying retail entrepreneurship using the
random allocation of retail stores to entrepreneurs as essentially a laboratory allows us to cleanly
measure aspects of retailing where there has traditionally not been any way to separately identify
cause and effect relationships.
The setting we study is the newly legalized retail cannabis industry in Washington state, which
began in 2014 and features a number of advantages as a laboratory for the study of retail strategy,
entrepreneurship, firm size, and competition. First, the number of new firms allowed to enter was
capped by regulatory design and excess demand for entry licenses by entrepreneurs led to a lottery
to allocate them. Firms could win multiple licenses in this lottery such that two firms applying for
the same number of licenses would, purely by random draw, end up with different numbers of stores.
This lottery that allocated licenses to own and operate retail stores is essentially unprecedented and
offers a unique opportunity to study the role of retail chain scale on outcomes in a transparent way.
Second, because this market is closely monitored by regulators, there exists exceptionally good
data on both lottery applications and post-entry outcomes. We observe every transaction conducted
1See Jovanovich (1982) or Holmes and Schmitz (1995) for reviews of research on barriers to firm expansion faced
by entrepreneurs. Pozzi and Schivardi (2015) provides an extensive overview of the types of regulations and measures
used by governments to restrict retail entry as well as trends in these regulations and empirical evidence on their
effects on consumers and firms.
2See Hurst and Pugsley (2011) for the share of retail firms that are “small businesses”, defined as having 20 or
fewer total employees. For occupation data on the self-employed see IRS (2019), the most common occupation is
construction services and other personal services.
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in the industry starting with the first sales, including upstream transactions. This means we
directly observe retail prices, store product assortments, vertical arrangements between retailers
and manufacturers, wholesale prices, and markups, all at the transaction level. These stores do
substantial amounts of sales, averaging $2.2 million per year in revenue.
Third, the industry is new and therefore we have the unique opportunity to observe and describe
the full evolution of firm choices and outcomes over time. The novelty of the market as a whole also
means retailers are especially important. Consumers must discover what products they value, pro-
ducers must decide what products to make and how, and retailers act as the intermediaries between
these two groups, deciding what products to stock, what prices to charge, what manufacturers to
purchase from, and how to position themselves to best compete with rivals. By 2021, 15 states had
voted to create legal retail industries for cannabis products, with many unresolved policy questions
and little evidence to guide policymakers who are writing the rules for what is a large and growing
industry.3 These unresolved policy questions include whether to allow vertical integration between
retailers and manufacturers, how much to tax cannabis and at what level (retail sales or upstream),
and of course whether to restrict retail entry or restrict the size of retail chains.4
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that condition on the number of applications
submitted by each firm, lottery outcomes are exogenous.5 We find that stores that win multiple
licenses and are thus part of multi-store firms grow to be substantially more profitable than stores
operating alone. Their variable profits are higher by an average of $380,000 per store per year in the
last year of the data, roughly 25% more than single-store operations. If we simply compared these
retailer profits in cross-sectional data, we would see this positive correlation between number of out-
lets and profits, and therefore we might conclude that stores owned by higher quality entrepreneurs
earn higher profits and their higher quality also allows them to grow and open more outlets. While
this effect is generally likely to be true, our first contribution is to show that there is a direct causal
3Retail sales of cannabis products surpassed $20 billion in 2020 and are expected to grow to roughly $60 billion
by 2025, see https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2019-10-30/legal-marijuana-market-value-to-hit-59-billion-
by-2025-global-market-insights-inc
4See Thomas (2019), who studies the efficiency implications of the retail license cap and estimates a counterfactual
with free entry of retailers, but does not study the issue of multi-store retail chains. Hollenbeck and Uetake (2019),
Hansen, Miller, Seo, and Weber (2020), and Hansen, Miller, and Weber (2018) all study tax policy and how it
interacts with retailer market power and the vertical structure between manufacturers and retailers.
5In related work, Cirik and Makadok (2020) use the same cannabis store lottery to measure the effect of entry
order on subsequent store profits and how this first-mover effect is moderated by availability of online reviews. Our
approach is also similar to that of Rao (2020) who uses the partially random nature of FDA approvals for new drugs
to generate exogenous changes to market structure and measure how investment decisions in the Pharmaceutical
industry respond to competition.
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effect in the opposite direction as well. Retail firm size matters, and having more outlets causes
higher profits directly. Moreover, for the type of entrepreneur operating a mom-and-pop style retail
outlet, the returns to scale are quite large.
Our second contribution is to study whether this increase in profits comes at the expense of
consumers and more broadly what mechanism is driving it. We are particularly interested in
prices and whether multi-store firms use their greater local market power and brand awareness to
earn higher profits by charging higher prices to consumers or if they increase profits using other
strategies.6 We also investigate whether greater scale leads multi-store firms to restrict the product
variety available to consumers. We first show that multi-store chains charge substantially lower
retail prices than smaller firms, including for the same products. Because we observe wholesale
prices, we can rule out that this is merely the result of cost-side economies of scale. While we do
find evidence of traditional cost-side retail economies of scale, in that the multi-store firms pay lower
wholesale prices for the same products as smaller firms, the difference in retail prices is substantially
larger. In other words, chain retailers charge both lower prices and lower margins. This is despite
enjoying higher awareness or reputation and having greater market power. We also find that multi-
store retailers offer larger assortments, both in number of brands carried and number of products.
We find that the difference in prices and assortment sizes is not initially present but grows over
time. In this context, the combination of lower prices and larger product variety suggest that a
more concentrated retail sector with larger retailers provides significant benefits to consumers as
well as to the retailers themselves.7
Studying the relationship between prices and retail firm size in this clean setting also helps shed
light on several ongoing debates. In particular, the theoretical study of consumer search and retail
competition has made great progress in advancing our understanding of the role of the retail sector
in markets with consumer search costs, but fundamental issues still remain unresolved. One of
these is why different retail stores charge different prices for the same product, and in particular
whether larger retailers will ultimately charge higher or lower prices, holding costs and other factors
6Thomadsen (2005) shows that co-owned fast food outlets do charge significantly higher prices when located
relatively close to each other. In a related work, Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar (2012) develop a demand model that
accounts for location endogeneity and spatial competition to measure the net impact of store openings on chain
outlet sales in the fast food industry. They use this model to identify what stores provide more or less value to their
chain partners and to measure cannibalization between franchised chain outlets.
7These results are also consistent with new work by Bronnenberg (2018), which studies the role of retail in a
general equilibrium setting and shows how the retail sector as a whole benefits consumers by increasing product
variety.
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fixed. The disagreement stems from different ways of modeling the nature of consumer search and
demand and how these effect retailer pricing incentives.
One view, shown in models such as McAfee (1994) and Armstrong and Vickers (2020) is that
larger or multi-store firms should have more “captive” customers who do not price search and
therefore they should charge higher prices than smaller firms.8 Another key aspect of economies of
scale in retail is that larger chains can spread the fixed costs of contracting with manufacturers over
more stores and this allows them to stock more brands and offer larger assortments. If retailers
with more outlets can offer larger assortments, their pricing and positioning should adjust as well.
Anderson and De Palma (2006) show that larger assortments should result in higher prices under
standard demand conditions. Kim, Allenby, and Rossi (2002) also show that preference for variety
should lead retailers with larger assortments to offer higher average prices. A final force that would
cause stores in multi-store firms to set higher prices is that most co-owned stores are located near
each other, and therefore these firms have greater local market power, which should result in higher
markups due to less competition (Thomadsen (2005)).
On the other hand, if the firm with multiple outlets has greater awareness but its customers are
not “captive”, it should have an incentive to charge lower prices to prevent them from searching at
rivals (Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009), Zhou (2014)). As noted above, multi-store retailers
should be able to offer more products than single-store retailers if it is profitable to do so. Retail
stores that offer more products may attract a larger but more price-sensitive “mass market” set of
consumers while small firms are left to offer a more niche assortment but sell at higher prices to
high value consumers (Rhodes (2015)). Kuksov and Lin (2017) also show how a larger assortment
can be used to signal low prices to prevent customer search. This assortment effect would result in
multi-store retailers charging lower prices but earning higher profits.
Our results show a clear causal relationship that larger retailers with more stores do charge
lower prices and combine their lower prices with larger assortments.9 The literature makes different
8Prior work has found that both hotel chains and chain restaurants benefit from reputation effects that allow
them to charge significantly higher overall prices in this way, see Hollenbeck (2017) and Klopack (2018). Hollenbeck
(2017) finds that chain hotels earn roughly 25% higher revenues than otherwise identical independent hotels and
attributes this to greater consumer information on chain hotel quality due to their ability to build reputation over
multiple outlets. Klopack (2018) finds a similar demand side advantage in the restaurant industry.
9These results show evidence for countervailing buyer power, that is the idea that an increase in market power
downstream might benefit consumers by increasing retailer buyer power relative to suppliers, decreasing input prices,
and passing a portion of the savings along to consumers. It is a theoretical debate in what conditions a downstream
merger can improve social surplus (Inderst and Shaffer (2007) , Symeonidis (2010), Loertscher and Marx (2019)) and
this has limited empirical evidence (Barrette, Gowrisankaran, and Town (2020)).
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predictions on the direction of these effects and so it is an empirical question what forces will
dominate. Our evidence suggests larger retailers do not exploit captive customers and that their
larger product variety is not associated with higher prices. Among the models predicting lower
prices for larger or multi-store firms, we find that the evidence is more consistent with the view
that larger assortments attract more price-sensitive customers (Rhodes (2015), Kuksov and Lin
(2017)) as opposed to them pricing lower due to a prominence effect. The gap in prices between
multi-store and single-store firms is not initially present but grows substantially over time, as does
the difference in assortment size between stores in multi-store chains and stores operating alone.10
We also find, consistent with Rhodes (2015), that customers at multi-store retailers are more likely
to purchase baskets of products containing products from multiple brands and multiple categories.
Finally, we estimate a model of consumer demand and find that multi-store firms face signif-
icantly more price sensitive customers than do single-store firms and that this difference is also
growing over time. This suggests that consumer demand shifts outwards for multi-store firms, as
evidenced by their higher profits and sales, but the marginal consumer visiting a multi-store firm
is substantially more price sensitive than the marginal consumer faced by a single-store firm.
These results together suggest that, multi-store firms turn a small initial advantage in their
ability to offer larger assortments to cumulatively build a large profit advantage by positioning
themselves as the large-assortment, low-cost retail option that attracts the largest segment of cus-
tomers. As shown in Rhodes (2015), this result is quite general and does not depend on strong
assumptions about the shape of demand. This is consistent with work in the marketing literature
on the important role for assortment in retail store choice, which has shown that retailer assortment
is more important than pricing in store choice decisions (Fox, Montgomery, and Lodish (2004), Bri-
esch, Chintagunta, and Fox (2009)) and that customer perceptions of retailers are highly effected
by the presence of large assortments (Mogilner, Rudnick, and Iyengar (2008), Hoch, Bradlow, and
Wansink (1999)). Retailers positioning strategies are multidimensional, as emphasized by Corstjens
and Corstjens (1995), and even relatively small differences in scale can have large effects on profits
if they facilitate successful repositioning.
While it is a limitation that the retail chains we study are relatively small, these results still have
significant policy implications. Small firms account for 80% of U.S. businesses and are generally
10A similar type of result is seen in Ilanes and Moshary (2019), who study the deregulation of Washington’s retail
liquor industry and find that increases in competition lead firms to offer larger assortments.
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seen as especially important for local labor markets and thus are often targeted with subsidies
or special treatment by local governments (Jones and Pratap (2020)). We find that clear causal
evidence that economies of scale for entrepreneurs operating as mom-and-pop retailers are quite
large, which suggests that policies designed to support entrepreneurs, such as by helping to finance
their expansion, can be very valuable both for the success of small businesses and for consumers.
Our results also suggest that other barriers to expansion, such as zoning restrictions, legal red tape
that raises the cost of opening or expanding new businesses, access to capital, insurance or other
services, potentially have very high costs to both retailers and consumers.11 These implications
are likely true for entrepreneurs entering in industries with licensure restrictions or retail zoning
restrictions like the one we study. Severe restrictions on securing retail licenses are common in
alcohol retail in many states and of course in the newly growing retail cannabis industry, although
at some level nearly all retail is subject to licensing requirements (Pozzi and Schivardi (2015)).
Most directly, as policymakers develop rules for cannabis retail many states limited the size of
retail chains using similar licensure restrictions and our results suggest these limitations are highly
costly both for entrepreneurs and consumers.12
The results also provide clear managerial implications. First, we show that the returns to expan-
sion for small retailers are large, plausibly larger than most entrepreneurs would predict. Second,
we show that in this category, and likely in many similar categories, positioning a retailer with a
large-assortment, low-price brand early can be a highly valuable use of a first-mover advantage.
Indeed, we show that having multiple stores is a sufficient condition for this positioning. Neverthe-
less, it may not be necessary as we do observe some single-store retailers operating successfully in
this way. For most retailers, however, the marginal effect of an increase in assortment by adding
a new brand or supplier is not very large when taken alone and when focusing on the short run.
To the extent that many entrepreneurs who enter the retail sector therefore do not realize (or un-
derestimate) the long-term gains associated with a large-assortment positioning strategy there is
a clear managerial implication from our results, although one that is subject to the same caveats
about the uniqueness of the setting described above.
11Related work by Maican and Orth (2020) uses a dynamic structural model of firm entry and finds that a reduction
in entry regulations in the Swedish retail industry lead to productivity improvements and that retailers re-position
themselves and offer larger varieties. For an extensive overview of other work on the effects of retail entry restrictions
see Pozzi and Schivardi (2015).
12A total of 15 U.S. states and several Canadian provinces currently employ similar license caps. Similar regulations
are also used for alcohol or tobacco retail licenses in 17 states.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 1 describes the data and setting with an
emphasis on the transaction-level retail data and the retail license lottery, Section 2 provides results
on the differences in variable profits and price and assortment decisions between multi-store chains
and single-store firms, Section 3 studies consumer demand differences between these types of stores,
and Section 4 discusses and concludes.
1 Data and Setting
This section describes the institutional setting and key features of the data. The regulatory setting
dates back to a November 2012 popular referendum passed by voters in Washington state. The
new law made marijuana products legal for licensed firms to produce and sell and legal to purchase
by any person over 21 years of age. The state legislature subsequently created a tax and regulatory
regime for the new legal market by passing I-502 which set up the rules for the legal market to begin
sales in July 2014. The state created 3 new types of firm licenses, differentiated by their position
in the vertical structure of the industry, similar to the three tier system for alcohol regulation.
Firms can be licensed as retailers, processors, or producers. Processors and producers are allowed
to hold both licenses and vertically integrate, but retailers are not allowed to vertically integrate. In
addition, the total number of retail licenses was strictly capped.13 This license cap and how licenses
were allocated forms the basis of our empirical strategy and we therefore discuss it at length.
License Lottery:
During the creation of the legal marijuana industry, Washington decided to strictly limit the total
amount of entry by retailers. This was motivated by concerns about widespread use of marijuana,
which is thought to have negative health effects and social externalities.14 In addition, there was
a concern about the impact of over-entry by retailers on neighborhood character and property
values.15 Finally, one of the goals of legalization is to remove marijuana sales from the black
market so that they can be regulated and monitored, and this goal is more easily achieved with
fewer retail shops for regulators to monitor.
13See also Thomas (2019) who studies the effects on consumption and welfare of this cap and simulates a free
entry counterfactual. A total of 15 U.S. states and several Canadian provinces currently employ similar license caps.
Similar regulations are also used for alcohol or tobacco retail licenses in 17 states.
14For a review of these issues, see Hall, Stjepanovic, Caulkins, Lynskey, Leung, Campbell, and Degenhardt (2019).
15See Tyndall (2019) for a study of the effect of dispensaries on nearby home prices, which finds close to zero but
potentially small negative effects in Vancouver, BC.
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The result was the choice to limit entry to an initial total of 334 retailers for the state of
Washington.16 These licenses were allocated at the city level, with the allocation determined by
population, population density, and an estimate of past-month marijuana users taken from historical
survey data. Expectations by market participants were that this industry would be highly lucrative
and demand to enter the industry by entrepreneurs significantly exceeded the number of entrants
preferred by the state government, leading to the unusual choice to allocate licenses via a lottery.
Lotteries were held separately at the city level, and 75 cities experienced excess demand for the
available retail licenses, resulting in 75 different lotteries being held. In addition, in 47 cities there
was not excess demand for licenses.17 We observe the full list of applicants as well as the ordering
determined by the random draw that constituted each lottery.18 In order to potentially win a retail
license in the lottery, firms needed to file a valid application, which included securing a location
for the retail store within the regulatory guidelines and paying a $250 non-refundable application
fee.19 Among the regulatory guidelines the proposed location of each store had to be at least one
thousand feet from elementary or secondary schools, public parks, libraries, among other locations.
These regulations along with reluctance by landlords to permit cannabis shops made securing the
store location a major barrier to entry for filing an application for the lottery.
Table 1 shows summary statistics on license applications in lottery markets. On average, there
were 4.1 applicants per license in these markets with a wide degree of variation. In the largest
market, Seattle, there were 191 applications for 21 licenses. In order to prevent large firms from
dominating the retail sector, firms were not allowed to own more than 3 total retail licenses anywhere
in the state.20
In July 2015, the state updated its licensing regime. In the first year of the market, Washington
had failed to close down formerly unregulated medical marijuana retailers and they were operating
in a grey market. In July 2015, Washington increased the total number of retail licenses available
from 334 to 556 in order for some of these medical marijuana retailers to enter the market. At the
16This number was chosen somewhat arbitrarily to match the number of state-owned liquor stores under Wash-
ington’s state monopoly on retail alcohol sales that lasted until 2012.
17“Lottery Results for Marijuana Retail Stores Available on WSLCB Website,” Washington State Liquor and
Cannabis Board, available at https://lcb.wa.gov/pressreleases/lottery-results-marijuana-retail-stores-available-wslcb-
website.
18The lottery results for the market of Longview, WA were not available.
19If issued, the store was responsible for paying a $1000 annual fee for issuance and renewal.
20According to the regulation, "Any entity and/or principals within any entity are limited to no more than three
retail marijuana licenses with no multiple location licensee allowed more than thirty-three percent of the allowed
licenses in any county or city." Other regulations included: the prohibition of internet sales and delivery of product,
the prohibition of sales across state lines and the sale of marijuana products below their acquisition cost.
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same time, any medical marijuana retailer that did not receive a license was forced to close. The
newly available licenses were awarded according to the initial lottery draws and thus these draws
were still overwhelmingly the mechanism by which the new licenses were allocated in the second
wave.
Table 1 also shows the resulting distribution of stores across markets. The number of stores
per thousand people in 2017 was 1.38 but with substantial variation. Table 2 shows the joint
distribution of applications filed in the lottery and store licenses won. Conditional on the number
of applications filed, the number of licenses won is the result of a random draw. This represents
the basis of our identification strategy.
There are two complicating factors. First, licenses can be acquired in both non-lottery markets
or through the secondary market where firms that own licenses can be purchased by other firms.
The second of these is rare and we observe it when it occurs.21 Second, we observe loose partnerships
between stores that are owned by different firms. This typically takes the form of stores operating
under similar names or sharing the same website. We carefully document these practices in our
data.
Ultimately, our goal is to compare the outcomes of stores in multi-store chains to those operating
in single-store firms using the lottery to provide cleanly exogenous variation. Multi-store chains that
acquire their licenses bypassing the original lottery or form partnerships would not make for valid
comparisons. Therefore we take a conservative approach and exclude any firm who acquired its
stores outside the lottery or other multi-store partnerships from our definition of “multi-store”. The
result is that some of the firms we designate as “single-store” may benefit from the same economies
of scale as the multi-store firms, either on the cost side or on the demand side. Therefore all our
results should be taken as lower bounds for the true size of these effects. Finally, we note that other
than their chain size, the two types of stores are broadly similar on observable characteristics, with
no significant differences in their entry timing or location, and single-store and multi-store firms
have 13% and 15% of their locations in Seattle, respectively.
A final concern might be strategic entry into lotteries with better chances of winning a store.
Higher quality managers may be strategic about entry, as shown by Goldfarb and Xiao (2011), which
could hinder our identification strategy. Strategic entry would specifically require that managers
have foresight not about market quality but about which markets have too few lottery entries
21Only 32 licenses are bought or sold during the sample period.
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relative to market quality. However, the number of lottery entries is not observed by firms at the
time they file their own application, which mitigates this concern. In addition, we run a series of
tests shown in Appendix B that rules out strategic entry as an explanation for our results.
We also collect data from Kantar Analytics on advertising spending for firms in this industry.
Summary statistics for this data are shown in the Appendix, as well as robustness tests for our main
results when advertising spending is included as a covariate. We find little difference in advertising
spending between single-store and multi-store firms and little change in our results when advertising
is included.
Transactions Data:
In addition to the awarding of entry rights via lottery, there is a second unique feature of this setting.
In order to tightly monitor the marijuana industry, Washington requires all industry participants
to enter all transactions into an administrative database. Thus we are able to observe all sales that
have ever taken place in the industry, including both retail sales to consumers and sales between
retailers and wholesalers, both at the transaction level. These data include both retail price and
wholesale price for each transaction. Observing wholesale costs is particularly unusual as this is
typically carefully guarded information. Washington regulations only allow for linear prices between
processors and retailers, so no vertical arrangements such as fixed payments or slotting allowances
take place in this market.22 The comprehensive and detailed data on firm outcomes and choices
provide a unique opportunity to track how a new industry evolves from the beginning.
Most notably, we are able to construct profit margins at the transaction level by measuring
the wholesale price each retailer paid for each product and link those prices to the final retail
sale. In addition, the sum of these margins over all transactions gives a direct measure of variable
profits. In total, we observe roughly 80 million transactions worth $2.5 billion between July 2014
and September 2017.
Table 3 presents summary information on the distribution of monthly revenues and variable prof-
its across firms and time. Retailers in this industry earn large revenues, with a mean of $180,000
22If retailers and processors were allowed to use vertical contracts with fixed payments, it would significantly com-
plicate our analysis for two reasons. First, the fixed payments would be unobserved in the tracking system, although
Hristakeva (2020) shows how the details of these contracts can be estimated using product selection decisions. Sec-
ond, they would effect both wholesale prices and assortments and could be related to retailer size. Hristakeva (2020)
shows that firms use these vendor allowances to promote their products and exclude low-cost rivals and that the
use of vertical contracts distorts both assortment and pricing decisions. In a related work, Hristakeva (2021) shows
that retailers’ ability to extract these vertical payments depend in an important way on their ability to threaten to
replace a processor’s product with a competitor’s product and that smaller retailers benefit more from this ability
than do larger retailers.
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per month or $2.2 million per year in 2017. This is somewhat right-skewed, as the largest retailers
average $6-10 million per year. To provide a comparison, the average store-level revenue is approx-
imately 3-4 times larger than the average revenue of Washington’s liquor stores from 2012-2015,
according to Ilanes and Moshary (2019).
Table 3 also shows the distribution of average prices and total monthly sales across firms and
time. Figure 1 shows visually how average wholesale and retail prices started out much higher in
the first year of the industry, were highly volatile for the first 12 months, and eventually settled
down to a stable lower price. In 2017, retailers charged an average price of $15.2 per unit for
marijuana products and paid an average price of $7.5 per unit to their upstream supplier. This
leaves an average profit margin of .54, or a markup of roughly 140%. Prices are volatile and falling
in the first two years of the data as most firms (manufacturers and retailers) enter the market. We
thereby focus most of our analysis on the last year of the data when the market is relatively stable.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for 74 markets
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Initial Cap 3.43 3.72 1 21
Revised Cap 5.82 6.92 1 42
Applicants per Market 15.07 25.62 2 191
Distinct companies per Market 12.52 18.69 2 135
Applicants per License 4.07 2.78 1.25 16
Prob. Win 0.34 0.17 0.06 0.8
Stores per 1k People[1] 0.35 1.65 0.01 29.41
Note: [1] Population count is taken from the 2010 Census. Number of
stores from Jan/2017.
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Figure 1: Average Retail and Wholesale Price By Category Over Time ($/gram)
Note: These figures show category level average retail prices and wholesale prices over time.
Retail prices are shown on the left and are tax-inclusive. Wholesale prices are shown on the right.








1 117 0 0
2 60 10 0
3 76 18 3
4 26 8 0
5+ 22 10 3
Note: This table shows the joint distribution of
applications filed and stores ultimately won in
the 2014 retail lottery.
2 Effects of Scale on Profits and Prices
The first question we study is whether there exists a direct causal effect of firm scale on profits
in the mom-and-pop retail sector and how large is it. In general, scale is a strategic choice. We
therefore expect a positive association between firm size and profits, due in part because more
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Table 3: Monthly Variable Profits, Revenue, and Total Sales
Mean Std. Dev. 5th %ile 95th %ile Mean Mean Mean
Subsample: Seattle Lottery Non-Lottery
Variable profit:
2014 45,508 66,328.6 555.7 179,369.4 112251.7 49,870.6 29,966.2
2015 81,505.8 88,407.5 3,734.2 239,839.5 128,837.8 91,067.3 52,886.7
2016 96,069.7 95,846.3 5,670.3 274,647 109,313.7 116,866 66,536
2017 83,793.1 82,037.6 6,184.9 240,325.5 97,674.2 104,280.7 63,831.4
Revenue:
2014 81,441 106,468.4 3,274.8 312,072.5 210,699 89,991.1 50,981.5
2015 146,057.4 152,181.1 10,131.5 428,832 233,379.1 162,932.6 95,547.5
2016 184,124.4 180,933.7 13,512.1 540,096.4 204,465.8 222,994.6 128,923.6
2017 170,765 162,839.2 14,538.1 487,896.3 193,003.8 211,094.9 131,470.3
Retail Price:
2014 17.9 6.4 8.1 29.6 18.9 18.4 16
2015 10.9 2.7 7.3 15.2 11.7 11.1 10.4
2016 8.8 1.7 6.6 11 9.5 8.9 8.8
2017 8.3 1.3 5.8 10.3 8.8 8.3 8.3
Wholesale Cost:
2014 7.9 1.7 5.4 11.1 8.8 7.9 7.9
2015 4.9 1 3.6 6.6 5.2 4.9 4.8
2016 4.2 0.9 3.4 5.1 4.4 4.2 4.2
2017 4.2 0.5 3.4 5 4.3 4.1 4.2
Total Units Sold:
2014 4,541 5,468.9 232 15,213.8 12,529.6 5,106.5 2,526.7
2015 13,801.1 14,590.9 893.4 40,924 20,973.8 15,325.5 9,238.6
2016 21,214.5 21,443 1,564.4 59,753 21,875.8 25,547.5 15,060.9
2017 21,029.9 20,838.4 1,618.7 59,033.6 21,969 26,012.5 16,175.3
Assortment:
2014 8.4 6.1 1 21 13.4 9 6.2
2015 24.8 12.1 7 46 27.1 26.1 21
2016 38.5 17.4 13 71 39.1 41.2 34.6
2017 46.6 20.4 17 86 49.8 49.4 44
Note: This table shows summary data on store-level variable profits, revenues, retail prices, and units sold. Data shown are monthly and
do not include the first partial month in which each store opened. Retail price data and total sales are calculated within store each month.
Units refer to the quantity sold in terms of weight. Lottery markets refer to markets where excess demand for retail licenses resulted in
entry lotteries. Assortment is measured as the number of brands carried.
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efficient entrepreneurs are able to grow larger by expanding and adding more outlets. In this case,
it is a challenge to separately identify the effect of scale from entrepreneurial quality in profitability.
Our setting removes this aspect of reverse causality and allows us to directly measure the effect of
randomly generated size differences on profitability.
An important component of the empirical strategy is that we observe the applications filed that
did not win licenses via the lottery. Firms who apply for more entry licenses may have higher quality
management, greater commitment to the industry, or be better capitalized than firms applying for
fewer licenses. Such selection effects in the applications phase could hinder the assumption of scale
being exogenous. Therefore, it is key to our analysis that we are able to control for number of
applications filed. Conditional on them, we rely on the retail license lottery to generate random
variation in firm size. We address this further in section 2.2 below.
2.1 Variable Profits
Specification Our primary dependent variable is the variable profits constructed from the transaction-
level sales data. These are defined as total monthly revenues minus total monthly wholesale costs
incurred. This differs from profits after other costs such as rents, wages, marketing and other costs.
We discuss below how these costs may effect the interpretation of our results but take observed
variable profits as the initial benchmark outcome of interest.
We ultimately want to identify the causal effect of retail firm size as measured by whether or
not a store is part of a multi-store firm on store-level profits. To measure this effect we regress store
profits on an indicator for whether or not the firm won multiple stores in the lottery, conditional
on the number of applications filed. Our preferred empirical specification takes the form of the
following regression equation:
yimt = α+β ·Multi-Storei+
N∑
j=1
γj ·✶{Applicationsi = j}+
T∑
k=1
δk ·✶{Ageit = k}+φt+ηm+ǫimt (1)
Here the dependent variable yimt is the store-month variable profits in market m. The right
hand side contains a dummy for if the store is a member of a multi-store firm as well as fixed
effects for time, market and store age. We control for the number of applications filed in the lottery
flexibly, by including fixed effects for each possible number of applications. Our assumption is that
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conditional on these fixed effects assignment in to the multi-store treatment is a result of random
chance.
One concern with this specification is that, while winning a lottery grants entrepreneurs the
right to enter the market, it does not compel them to. Some lottery winners could choose not to
subsequently enter and this choice could be correlated with factors that also determine profitability,
for instance ability to raise capital, motivation, quality of outside options, etc. We use the fact that
we observe the full set of lottery applications to investigate this issue. We find 11 firms that won
licenses in the lottery never entered and 7 firms were subsequently blocked from entering due to
problems with their location or other disqualifying factors. We present a more detailed discussion
of these firms in the Appendix A.7.
Because the results could be effected by this non-compliance, we also consider an empirical
specification that uses the number of licenses won in the lottery as an instrument for the number
of stores that opened. For the vast majority of firms there is no non-compliance and so these are
the same, and therefore this is a strong instrument. Moreover, unlike the number of stores that
opened, there is no non-compliance with the number of licenses won which is determined by random
draw. This means that this instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction. We therefore estimate a
variation on equation 1 using the number of licenses won in the lottery to construct an instrument
for the variable “Multi-Store.” 4 contrast our results from the OLS and IV specifications. We rely
on the IV specification for all subsequent results in the paper.
Results Table 4 shows a benchmark set of results with different levels of fixed effects included.
In each case we focus on the last year of the data in recognition of the fact that this is an evolving
market with entry of new firms (both at the retail level and upstream) taking place throughout
2014-2016 and prices falling rapidly in 2014-2015. By the last year of the data the industry is more
mature and the number of firms and their prices and sales levels are relative stable.
First, in column 1 we show the baseline result with no control variables. It shows that stores in
multi-store firms earn roughly $29,000 more in variable profits than single-store firms per month.
Column 2 includes fixed effects for number of applications filed in order to account for differences in
management quality or capitalization that may lead to more applications and thus more stores. The
coefficient on the multi-store firm dummy therefore isolates the effect of retail chain membership
on profits which, conditional on the number of applications filed, is generated by random chance
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Table 4: Effect of Multi-Store Firm Membership on Store Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multi-store (lottery) 29029.4*** 22488.2** 22107.9** 32144.2*** 31697.0*** 35028.8*
(6350.790) (7010.451) (6964.426) (5741.256) (4465.308) (17333.013)
# Applications FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes
Age in Months FE Yes Yes
IVs Yes
Observations 3332 3255 3255 3254 3254 3255
R2 0.006 0.022 0.029 0.483 0.579 0.579
F statistic 1905.5
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of being in a multi-store firm on store-level variable profits. Only multi-store firms who acquired
each of their licenses via the retail lottery are included. Data sample period is April 2016 to April 2017. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the store-time level.
via the lottery. This reduces the profit difference to just under $23,000 per month. Columns 3 and
4 show the effects of date and market fixed effects, respectively.23 These fixed effects control for
differences across markets in profitability and time trends. Column 5 shows the results with each of
these as well as age fixed effects to account for differences in entry timing and the natural increase
in profits during a firm’s first year. Lastly, we account for non-compliance of entry in column
6 by instrumenting the “Multi-Store" indicator with the number of licenses won in the lottery.
Accounting for each of these results in shows that after conditioning on number of applications as
well as market, time, and age, stores in multi-store firms earn roughly $32,000 higher monthly profits
than single-store firms. The effect is highly significant and its size amounts to roughly $380, 000 in
higher annual profits. This difference is quite substantial, as median store profits during this period
are $820,000 per year and mean store profits are just under $1.2 million.
Next, we take our preferred IV specification with all fixed effects included and show how the
effect varies over different subsamples of the data. The results are in Table 5. For comparison
purposes, column 1 repeats the main result from Table 4 that used only the last year of the data.
Columns 2 displays this result when we use the full sample from 2014 to 2017. We find a smaller
overall effect when the initial years of data are included. This finding is supported by Figure 2,
23We consider alternative definitions of ‘market’ when constructing market fixed effects. These include city and
county fixed effects and markets defined by radii around each retailer of 1 mile, 5 miles, and 10 miles. We find
consistent results for each specification. The latter set of results are available in the Appendix.
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Table 5: Effect of Multi-Store Firm Membership on Store Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2016-17 2014-2017 2016-17 2016-17 2016-17
Stores ≤ 1 year old Stores > 1 year old ln(profits)
Multi-store (lottery) 35028.8* 29411.3* 16128.5 45804.4** 0.70***
(13776.509) (14691.275) (17276.642) (17538.108) (0.194)
# Applications FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age in Months FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IVs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3255 5516 1527 1815 3255
R2 0.579 0.513 0.595 0.632 0.540
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of being in a multi-store firm on store-level variable profits. The dependent variable is variable profits
in columns 1-4 and log of variable profits in column 5. Data sample period is April 2016 to April 2017 in columns 2-5 and 2014-2017 in
column 1. Columns 3 and 4 show results only for stores less than one year old greater than 1 year old, respectively. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the store-time level.
which illustrates the result visually, showing the average monthly variable profits of multi-store and
single-store firms throughout the sample period. They begin the sample roughly equal and multi-
store firms slowly gain a profit advantage which becomes significant in 2016 and continues to grow
through the end of the sample period. This shows that the profit advantage is not simply a feature
of an initial period when the industry was just ramping up. Instead, the advantage associated
with being a member of a multi-store firm is growing with time. This figure also illustrates the
magnitude of the effect of firm size on store profits.
Columns 3 and 4 compare the effect size for firms in their first year of operation relative to the
period after the first year. The profit advantage associated with being part of a multi-store firm is
substantially larger later on in a store’s life compared with a smaller advantage in the first year.
This finding reinforces that the advantage is not temporary but is something that grows over time.
Finally, column 5 shows the result when the dependent variable is log of profits, to account for
potentially large variance and skewness in this variable.
Appendix B shows this causal effect of scale on profits is robust to a series of potentially con-
founding factors. These include robustness tests for strategic entry into markets with less competi-
tion for lottery slots, replication of the results with product fixed effects included, and tests for the
impact of store advertising.
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Figure 2: Variable Profits Over Time
2.2 The Importance of Entrepreneurial Quality
As a benchmark comparison for these results, we now explore the importance of entrepreneurial
quality for store-level profits. To do so, we isolate the set of single-store firms and compare their
variable profits in the final year of the data based on how many applications they filed in the lottery.
As we noted above in our discussion of identification, firms that filed more applications likely had
higher quality entrepreneurs, greater financing available, more commitment to this industry, or
more experience than did firms that only filed a single application.
We test this and show the results in Table 6. The sample only includes firms that operate single
stores and the results should be interpreted as descriptive and not causal, essentially showing the
average store profits for each number of applications controlling for market, age, and time. We
find that the firms who applied for more licenses end up with significantly higher profits among
these stores. The effect is largest for firms who applied for two stores but the effects for firms who
applied for 3 and 4 are not significantly different. The number of firms who applied for 5+ licenses
but only operate one store is quite small, and so these coefficients have very large standard errors
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Table 6: Relationship Between Number

















Age in Months FE Yes
Observations 2967
R2 0.570
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows results of a regression of
variable profits on number of applications filed.
Only firms with 1 active store are included in the
sample.
which make it difficult to interpret them.
The results show that entrepreneurs who are more committed, better financed, or more expe-
rienced do end up performing better in terms of variable profits. The monthly effect is equivalent
to $116,000 per year in additional variable profits. Comparing coefficients in Tables 4 (column
6) and 6, we see that the increase for entrepreneurs who filed two lottery applications is about
28% as large as the increase for entrepreneurs who end up with multiple stores. While we caution
that one of these results is causal and the other is merely descriptive, together these results imply
that entrepreneurial quality is associated with higher store profitability but being a member of a
multi-store firm has a larger effect on profits.
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3 Mechanisms Explaining Higher Profits
Next we explore the mechanism by which larger scale causes higher profits. We proceed in three
stages, first breaking the variable profits into their component parts to analyze differences across
store types in retail prices, wholesale prices, and units sold. Then we study whether assortment
decisions vary across different types of retailers. Finally, we study whether these effects vary based
on the relative proximity of stores that are partners in a multi-store firm.
3.1 Retail Prices and Wholesale Costs
In this subsection we analyze differences in pricing between independent stores operating alone and
stores that are members of multi-store firms. In particular we are interested if the large profit
advantage enjoyed by multi-store firms comes at the expense of consumers through higher retail
prices.
This serves as a test of to what extent greater market power leads retailers to increase prices.
Two stores owned by the same firm could internalize the pricing externality and raise prices as a
result. In addition, the theoretical literature on retail competition makes ambiguous predictions on
whether larger or more prominent retailers will charge higher or lower prices than smaller retailers,
all else equal. This makes this setting especially interesting to investigate the effect of scale on
pricing decisions as a primary mechanism.
We begin by using transaction level data on sales and prices to construct average retail prices,
average wholesale prices, variable profits per unit sold, and total units sold. We use data at the
product level to allow for product fixed effects, whereas variables were calculated at the store
level in the previous subsection. We define product at the manufacturer-category level, thus if a
manufacturer makes multiple products in the same category we aggregate these together.24
We estimate the effect of being in a multi-store firm on each of these variables following the
specification below: yikmt refers to the outcome of store i, selling product k, in market m, and time
24The categories are: usable marijuana (leaf) products, solid edible products, liquid products, extract products for
vaporizers, and âotherâ miscellaneous products. Together these account for over 95% of product sales and products
are defined by these categories in the regulatory transactions data.
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t.
yikmt = α+β ·Multi-Storei+
N∑
j=1
γj ·✶{Applicationsi = j}+
T∑
k=1
δk ·✶{Ageit = k}+φt+ηm+ψk+ǫikmt
(2)
As in the previous section, we estimate this equation using the number of stores won in the
lottery as an instrument for the number of stores opened to remove any concerns related to non-
compliance with the lottery.
Table 7 shows the for a set of different dependent variables. The effect of membership in a
multi-store firm on variable profits is smaller because the unit of observation is now product as
opposed to store. We observe that, as expected, multi-store firms have lower average wholesale
prices than single-store firms. This is the traditional notion of economies of scale in retail, and
results from volume discounts and greater bargaining power with suppliers.
We also observe that multi-store firms set significantly lower retail prices than single-store firms
for the same products. This difference does not merely result from the multi-store firms passing
along the lower wholesale costs to final retail prices. Wholesale prices are lower by $.25 on average,
compared to a $1.08 difference in retail prices. Consequently, multi-store firms have significantly
lower variable profits per unit sold than single-store firms. They are able to have significantly higher
overall variable profits because they sell substantially more total units. Multi-store firms sell 41
more units of each product per month than single-store firms, a roughly 12% higher sales volume.
It is notable that the profit advantage enjoyed by stores that are members of multi-store firms
comes through lower prices and lower margins and not the opposite. Several advantages of expansion
to form local chains are be expected to result in higher and not lower prices. These include greater
reputation or consumer awareness, lower competition since these stores do not compete with one
another, and higher quality stores with larger assortments. The effect of a reduction on competition
by removing a competitor should be even more valuable in this setting due to the lack of potential
entry. We observe that the median number of stores in a market is 4 and stores that are part
of multi-store firms tend to be located near each other, with a median distance of 11 miles and
75% of stores are within 25 miles of their chain partners. Therefore these multi-store chains have
potentially substantial pricing power in their local areas and yet still charge lower prices than stores
operating alone.
We note that removing the product fixed effects from these specifications yields nearly identical
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Table 7: Effect of Multi-Store Firm Membership on Primary Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5)
Variable Profit Retail Price Wholesale Price Profit/Unit Units sold
Multi-Store 91.1 -1.08*** -0.25** -0.83*** 41.3
(111.187) (0.269) (0.095) (0.228) (36.028)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IVs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 183125 183125 183125 183125 183125
R2 0.230 0.726 0.749 0.607 0.201
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of membership in a multi-store firm on 5 outcome variables. In each column the
dependent variable is described in the column header. Data sample period is April 2016 to April 2017. The observation
level is product-store-week. Standard errors are clustered at the product-time level.
results for retail and wholesale prices, and slightly larger effects on units sold and thus variable
profit. This suggests that the results are not driven by differences in composition of products
offered, where multi-store chains offer more low quality products.
While the previous result focused on the last year of the data when store entry and pricing had
stabilized, in Table 8 we show how the results for each of these dependent variables changes over
the full 2014 to 2017 sample period.25 Notably, we see a clear time trend in that the difference in
average prices charged by multi-store firms is growing over time. The price difference is negligible
in 2015 but grows to $.69 by 2017. This represents a substantial gap in average prices as the median
price of 1 unit is $6.65 in 2017. We see no clear trend over time in wholesale prices, where there is
a clear advantage to multi-store firms in 2015 but no change over time. This suggests the growth
in the pricing gap is not caused by simply passing along to customers the wholesale costs savings
associated with multi-store firm membership.
Price margins, as measured by variable profit per unit sold, also fall substantially over time,
from a positive $.35 gap in 2015 to negative $.44 in 2017. At the same time, there is a large relative
increase in the number of units sold per product, from 90 fewer units per month in 2015 to 69 more
units in 2017.
25We implement the same specification as in equation 2 with the difference that the Multi-Store dummy is interacted
with year indicators.
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Table 8: Change Over Time in Effects of Multi-Store Firm Membership
(1) (2) (3) (4 ) (5)
Variable Profit Retail Price Wholesale Price Profit/Unit Units sold
Multi-Store=1 × year=2015 -679.2* 0.21 -0.21 0.42 -124.8*
(276.686) (0.528) (0.159) (0.427) (52.386)
Multi-Store=1 × year=2016 118.4 -0.91** -0.24* -0.67** 29.8
(149.067) (0.284) (0.099) (0.230) (39.532)
Multi-Store=1 × year=2017 509.8** -1.78*** -0.46*** -1.32*** 120.1**
(184.121) (0.324) (0.133) (0.251) (44.023)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
IVs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 251882 251882 251882 251882 251882
R2 0.059 0.605 0.626 0.466 0.081
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of membership in a multi-store firm on 5 outcome variables. In each column the dependent variable
is described in the column header. The observation level is product-store-week.
This growth in the price and profit advantage associated with multi-store chain membership
over time are consistent with the overall pattern shown in Figure 2. We visualize the difference in
retail prices over time in a similar way in Figure 3, and for wholesale prices in Figure 4.
3.2 Assortment Decisions and Store Variety
This section investigates results for assortment decisions. Choosing how many and which products
to stock are key decisions of a retailer. The theoretical literature on retail strategy and customer
preferences has grown to emphasize that the number of products sold and consumer search over
multiple products have significant interactions (Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox (2009), Mogilner,
Rudnick, and Iyengar (2008), Betancourt and Gautschi (1990), Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAlister
(1998)).
Retailers in this industry carry products from a set of five main categories, but carry potentially
very large numbers of varieties within those categories. Carrying products from a manufacturer
incurs a fixed cost, and multi-store firms are able to split that fixed cost over multiple stores such
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Figure 3: Retail Price Gap Grows Over Time
Note: This figure shows average retail prices over time for multi-store firms and single-store firms.
The grey area represents 95% confidence intervals.
that the benefit of carrying one more product may outweigh the cost for a larger number of products.
Multi-store firms have the option of expanding assortment size beyond what single-store firms can
offer if it is profitable to do so. We investigate whether this is true following the same empirical
strategy as depicted in equation 1.
Using transaction level data we construct the number of unique products sold in each store in
each month as well as the number of brands or manufacturers purchased from in each month.26
Results are shown in Table 9, which shows the effect of being a member of a multi-store firm on
assortment size defined these ways. Multi-store firms offer substantially larger assortments defined
in both ways compared to single-store firms, on a per-store basis. They offer products from 10.8
26A potential issue related to assortment is stockouts caused by supply chain shortages. These have been a
persistent feature of the Canadian retail cannabis industry due to a limitation on entry at the manufacturer level.
It is possible that multi-store firms are able to avoid stockouts, either by having greater leverage with regard to
their suppliers or by having larger assortments in the first place, and that this contributes to their overall advantage
relative to single-store firms. The setting we study has no limitation on manufacturer entry and subsequently has
hundreds of upstream suppliers. Therefore, we do not believe stockouts to be an important factor here.
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Figure 4: Wholesale Price Over Time
Note: This figure shows average wholesale prices over time for multi-store firms and single-store
firms. The grey area represents 95% confidence intervals.
more brands, which is roughly 30% more brands than the typical single-store firm.
We also show how this assortment difference varies over time by interacting the main effect with
year dummies. We show this result in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9. Figure 5 also demonstrates these
results visually using the raw data without fixed effects. At the beginning of the sample single-store
and multi-store firms offer similar assortment sizes but over time the multi-store firms increase their
per-store assortments. The disparity in number of products and number of brands offered increases
consistently over the course of the sample and by 2017 there is a substantial difference in number
of brands and products offered.27
These combined results showing multi-store firms offer larger assortments and charge lower
prices are consistent with the literature on store choice. Rhodes (2015) shows that when consumers
desire multiple products and have search costs, firms that offer more products will attract a larger
27These results are consistent with Ellickson (2007), showing that firms with the ability to pay the fixed cost to
increase assortment use increases in variety to compete with rivals.
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Table 9: Multi-Store Firms Offer Larger Assortments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(# Products) Log(# Brands) Log(# Products) Log(# Brands)
Multi-Store 0.24** 0.31***
(0.077) (0.080)
Multi-Store=1 × year=2015 0.11 0.087
(0.071) (0.064)
Multi-Store=1 × year=2016 0.18*** 0.26***
(0.046) (0.042)
Multi-Store=1 × year=2017 0.47*** 0.50***
(0.091) (0.082)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
IVs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2989 2989 4594 4594
R2 0.436 0.490 0.585 0.610
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of membership in a multi-store firm on assortment size and how this varies over time. In each
column the dependent variable is described in the column header. Number of products is the monthly number of unique inventory
IDs at the store level. Number of brands is the monthly number of processors purchased from at the store level. Standard errors are
robust and clustered at the store-time level.
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Figure 5: Number of Unique Products and Brands Over Time
but more price-sensitive set of consumers. This model makes specific predictions about consumer
demand which we explore in the next section.28
We also test another prediction of this model by examining whether shoppers at multi-store
firms are more likely to purchase multiple items together. Using the retail sales data we are able
to observe for a subset of stores how and individual items are bought together. Using this data, we
construct measures of how many distinct brands and how many categories are purchased together.
We use these measures of multi-product bundling as the dependent variables and repeat the
analysis above. Results are shown in Table 10. We find that customers who shop at stores that
are part of multi-store firms are more likely to buy from multiple brands and are more likely to
buy products in multiple categories during the same shopping trip. This is consistent with models
of consumer search and multi-product purchase that predict large assortment retailers to attract a
larger but more price sensitive group of customers.
28An alternative explanation is that larger firms such as multi-store chains have greater name recognition or
awareness in a market and thus may be the first choice for consumers searching for a specific product or low price. In
this case, search models like Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) or Zhou (2014) predict that this prominence gives
these stores an incentive to charge lower prices to deter customers from searching elsewhere. We test one prediction
of this model, that firms who have prominence due to being the first entrant into a market also charge lower prices
and find no difference in prices between first entrants and later entrants, both overall and in small markets. Results
are available upon request.
28
Table 10: Multi-Store Firms Make More Multi-Product Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unique Brands per Sale Categories per Sale log(# Brands) log(# Categories)
Multi-store 6.41 2.00* 1.27* 0.96**
(3.709) (0.950) (0.519) (0.323)
# Applications FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age in Months FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
IVs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 278 278 286 286
R2 0.332 0.330 0.224 0.219
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows the effects of membership in a multi-store firm on 2 measures of multi-product sales. In each column the
dependent variable is described in the column header. Number of unique brands per sale is the average number of unique brands per
transaction at the store level. Categories per sale is the average number of categories per transaction at the store level. These variables
are not available for all stores because not all stores enter data into the tracking system at the transaction level and we only include
stores and markets where this data is available. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the store-time level.
3.3 The Role of Proximity
In this subsection we analyze to what extent proximity between multi-store chain partners is nec-
essary for the profit results to hold and to what extent the results vary for nearby versus distance
chain partners. We also study to what extent our results depend on how we define a local geographic
market or the degree of competition in a market.
First, we collect data on the geographic distances between all retailers in the state. We use these
to define a more granular definition of competition and create a new variable capturing the distance
between chain partners. Most chain partners are located within the same market and relatively
close to each other, with a mean distance of 19.8 miles and a median distance of 10.8 miles. We
use this median to divide our set of multi-store firms into two groups, those nearer to one another
than the median distance and those further away from one another than the median. A distance
of roughly 10 miles is also a reasonable proxy for the amount of travel time that is realistic in this
setting before a retailer is out of reach, given that other options are available.29
In Table 11 we present the main set of results from the previous sections but stratified based
on whether the multi-store firms are nearby or far away from one another. We find that the effects
29Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar (2012) study cannibalization between chain stores and find that once a distance of
10 miles between stores is reached there is virtually no cannibalization between chain partners.
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Table 11: Main Effects Based on Store Proximity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Profits Log(# Brands) Retail Price Profit/Unit
Multi-store × Near 37567.1*** 6.62*** -2.12*** -1.24***
(5985.026) (1.681) (0.395) (0.289)
Multi-store × Far 17894.0*** 2.94 -0.069 -0.40
(4468.466) (1.715) (0.512) (0.363)
# Applications FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age in Months FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
IVs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3254 3254 183125 183125
R2 0.579 0.453 0.594 0.486
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
of multi-store firm membership on store variable profits are substantially higher for stores with
nearby chain partners compared to those whose chain partners are further away. We also find a
larger difference in assortment sizes, retail prices, and margins. The results for pries and margins
are especially noteworthy, given that we would expect nearby competitors who are co-owned to
take advantage of this reduction in competition to increase prices (Thomadsen (2005)).
It is also noteworthy that multi-store firms whose stores are more than 10 miles away from
each other are still more profitable than single-store firms in their markets. They also have larger
assortments, although this effect is not significant at the 5% level. In the case of multi-store firms
with stores that are far from each other, we expect less consumer awareness that the stores are part
of chains and possibly no awareness. The fact that they still earn a substantial profit advantage
despite this suggests the advantage does not come purely from consumer perceptions about chains,
for instance that they are higher quality.
4 Consumer Demand
In this section we estimate store-level consumer demand elasticities for each firm type over time.
The previous section has shown that multi-store firms eventually charge significantly lower prices
and margins than single-store firms, offer larger product varieties, and earn significantly higher
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profits. This leaves open the question of whether this strategy is replicable by single-store firms.
That is, does each firm type face the same consumer demand and or do multi-store firms face a
different marginal customer in terms of price sensitivity? Answering this will also further shed light
on what mechanism results in the substantially higher profits earned by multi-store chains.
We proceed to separately estimate the store-level elasticity of demand faced by each firm type
over time. We follow Hoch, Montgomery, Kim, and Rossi (1995) and Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Lin
(2019) in estimating and aggregating demand elasticities using category-level prices and sales vol-
umes. Let Jst consist of the categories sold at store s at week t. We construct these at the weekly
level and estimate the following log-log demand equation:
log(qjst) = αs +
∑
k∈Jst
βjklog(pjst) + τt + ǫjst (3)
We construct sales-weighted average prices pjst at the category level.
30 αs are store fixed effects
and τt are county-week fixed effects. These account for local time-varying demand shocks and
store-level time-invariant factors such as location or market-level demographics. We estimate this
equation separately for each category. The result are estimates of average own-price elasticities βjj
and cross-price elasticities βjk for every category and category-pair.
After including category, county-week, and store fixed effects there remains the possibility that
there are unobserved demand shocks at the store-week level that are correlated with prices and
cause price to be endogenous. This would bias price elasticity estimates towards zero, although
we are primarily interested in the difference in elasticity faced between single-store and multi-store
firms and this relative comparison is not necessarily biased. We use the availability of product-level
wholesale prices to construct cost-shifting instruments. In particular, for each product category, we
construct the average (log-unit) wholesale cost of all stores in a market and use these as instruments
for retail prices. This assumes that wholesale prices have a direct effect on retail prices but not
on final demand. The reason we use market-level averages is that if wholesalers observe the same
store-week demand shocks and have sufficient market power to adjust store-specific wholesale prices,
those prices would also respond to the same demand shocks. Using market-level wholesale prices
avoids this potential issue.
We also collect data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on the
30To construct average prices we simply divide total revenue at the store-week-type level by the corresponding
quantity of sales.
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temperature and average monthly rainfall at the county level in Washington state. In Washington
most growers use primarily or partially outdoor farming and so over the course of the year and
across the state the weather conditions plausibly have a large impact on the productivity and costs
of growing the raw inputs. We link these data to the county locations of each producer, then, using
the fact that we observe the full supply chain we link these cost shifters to final retail prices. We
calculate these variables first at the manufacturer-category level and then find the average at the
retailer-category level based on the set of manufacturers each retailer purchases from and lag them
by one month to include as additional cost-shifting instruments to identify the demand system.
4.1 Results of Demand Estimation
The estimated own-price elasticities are negative and lower than 1 for all categories. We thus focus
on the usable (leaf) marijuana product category which accounts for over 84% of sales. We estimate
demand separately for different firm type and time periods. Of particular interest is whether
multi-store firms face different marginal demand than single-store firms. Because we observe that
multi-store firms charge lower prices and earn higher sales, if they face the same demand curve as
single-store firms our estimated price coefficients might be closer to 0 as they are simply pricing in
a more inelastic region of the same demand curve. In other words, we cannot conclude the two firm
types face different demand if the multi-store firms have price elasticities closer to 0 in absolute
value since this might just indicate movement along the demand curve rather than different demand
curves.
Table 12 shows the estimated store-level elasticities by store type. Elasticities are estimated
with the prices of the other categories included in the regression but their coefficients are excluded
for space. We see that the OLS results are close to 1 for both firm types. When instruments are
included elasticities are substantially more negative, indicating the OLS results are biased towards
zero. Our preferred specification uses both the cost-shifting instruments and those constructed from
wholesale prices.
Our estimates show that the price coefficient for multi-store firms is significantly more negative
than the single-store coefficient, meaning multi-store firms face a significantly more price sensitve
marginal customer. Next, we test how these elasticities vary over time. Given that the stores
and products are new and there is rapid entry in 2014 and 2015, we expect consumer demand
responses may shift over time. We modify the demand model in equation 3 to allow for separate
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Table 12: Estimated Price Elasticities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
Single-Store × ln(Price) -0.92*** -1.37*** -1.50***
(0.028) (0.138) (0.133)
Multi-Store × ln(Price) -1.01*** -3.01*** -2.92***
(0.099) (0.238) (0.232)
Single-Store × Year=2015 ×ln(Price) -1.13***
(0.178)
Single-Store × Year=2016 ×ln(Price) -1.51***
(0.220)
Single-Store × Year=2017 ×ln(Price) -3.46***
(0.510)
Multi-Store × Year=2015 × ln(Price) -2.86***
(0.490)
Multi-Store × Year=2016 × ln(Price) -3.05***
(0.537)
Multi-Store × Year=2017 × ln(Price) -4.77***
(0.723)
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market*Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wholesale Price IVs Yes Yes Yes
Cost Shifter IVs Yes Yes
Observations 23038 23038 23012 23012
R2 0.904 0.895 0.899 0.893
First-stage F 445.3 155.3 67.0
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows estimated price elasticities for each store type in different subsamples
based on year. In each column the dependent variable is ln(Units sold). Both units sold and
price are for the usable marijuana product category. Elasticities are estimated with the prices
of the other categories included in the regression but their coefficients are excluded for space.
The pairwise comparison of coefficients in column 3 yields a p-value < .0001. For column
4, the pairwise comparison of coefficients between single-store and multi-store are: for 2015
p < .0001, for 2016 p = .004, and for 2017 p = .02.
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βjk coefficients for each store type each year in the data.
We find that demand is increasingly elastic over time for both store types, presumably due to
greater competition as stores who were awarded licenses in the lottery continue to enter the industry
during the full sample. We also find that in each time period multi-store firms have significantly
more elastic demand than the single-store firms. The pairwise comparison of coefficients for each
year is highly significant.
This difference in elasticities is true despite the fact that multi-store firms are also charging
significantly lower retail prices than single-store firms. These results suggest that over time con-
sumer demand shifts outwards for multi-store firms, as evidenced by their higher profits and sales,
but also that the marginal consumer visiting a multi-store firm is substantially more price sensitive
than the marginal consumer faced by a single-store firm.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Nearly 90% of retail firms are small businesses and retail is one of the most common types of
businesses started by entrepreneurs (Hurst and Pugsley (2011)). These small firms are also seen as
especially important for local economies and targeted with a wide range of special policies (Jones
and Pratap (2020)). Therefore, it is especially important to measure and understand the size and
nature of economies of scale for retail entrepreneurs. This is particularly true in industries where
license regulations mean that local policymakers have direct control over the scale that new firms
can achieve.
We use a unique setting where this type of license restriction resulted in the unusual choice to
use a lottery to award licenses. By combining this lottery mechanism with extremely rich data on
firm actions and profits we are able to provide clear causal evidence on how firm scale effects both
entrepreneurial outcomes and consumers. Our setting is also unique in that retail cannabis is a new
industry and we are able to document the full evolution of firm strategies and outcomes as they
develop over time in what is already a large and rapidly growing market worth $20 billion in the
U.S. in 2020.
Our results show that license caps like those used by Washington and other states are highly
costly for the entrepreneurs starting new businesses in this industry. The difficulty they face ex-
panding their retail operations result in a huge amount of foregone profits. Our results also imply
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that customers are also harmed by barriers to expansion by small retailers. Together, these results
suggest that policies designed to help entrepreneurs and mom-and-pop retailers expand their firms
and grow can be extremely valuable.
The unique nature of the data in this setting also allow it to be informative for retail strategy
more broadly. By tracking detailed measures of firm strategies over time from the beginning of the
industry, we show how multi-store retailers are able to take a small initial advantage in offering
larger assortments and cumulatively build this into a very large advantage in profitability by offering
a combination of low prices and large assortments.
This combination is somewhat counterintuitive. Much of the literature on retail variety argues
that larger varieties will result in higher prices (Anderson and De Palma (2006), Kim, Allenby,
and Rossi (2002)). In addition, multi-store firms have greater local market power and face less
competition, which most models predict will also result in higher consumer prices. An exception is
Rhodes (2015), who shows how in the presence of search costs and consumers who value multiple
products, firms that carry a larger assortment will attract a more price-sensitive “mass market” set
of consumers and respond by lowering prices. Our evidence is consistent with this model. We find a
large outward shift in demand associated with stores being members of a multi-store chain, but also
a shift towards more price-sensitive consumers who make more multi-product purchases. This model
is a general one, it simply requires that consumers have search costs and heterogeneous preferences
over products. We would expect the results to replicate in many retail settings, but especially in
settings with similar preferences, such as the retail markets for wine, liquor, and tobacco. The
results should also hold in the general class of single-category retailers such as bookstores, music
stores, pet supplies, tools and hardware, and certain speciality food and apparel categories.
Two important caveats are that this is a new industry and that the license restrictions in this
market are unusual in that there are no truly large chains for small firms to contend with. But, while
our results are limited to a set of relatively small players unlike truly large retailers like Amazon
or Walmart, there is value in focusing on smaller firms not just for the study of entrepreneurs but
for studying economies of scale as well. We would expect larger effects as firms vary between 1 and
2 stores vs 100 and 101, and generally if scale effects have decreasing returns it would be hard to
replicate this type of study for very large retail chains.
Still, our results provide clearest takeaways on the value of scale to small entrepreneurs. A
cross-sectional analysis of the entrepreneurs who entered this industry would find large differences
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in profits and number of outlets and again might assume that higher quality entrepreneurs were
able to run their businesses more successfully and expand as a result, when the true causation in
this case runs in the opposite direction. Therefore barriers to scale, such as capital constraints,
legal red-tape, etc are likely to be a significant impediment to entrepreneurial success if they keep
firms too small.
Ultimately consumers may also benefit from a more concentrated retail sector with fewer but
larger firms. This is clear from the lower prices, larger assortments, and higher overall sales asso-
ciated with retail expansion. Despite reducing competition, margins decrease rather than increase
at these stores. This suggests that barriers to scale such as Washington’s cap on the number of




Anderson, S., and A. De Palma (2006): “Market Performance with Multiproduct Firms,”
Journal of Industrial Economics, 14(1), 95–109.
Armstrong, M., and J. Vickers (2020): “Patterns of Price Competition and the Structure of
Consumer Choice,” working paper.
Armstrong, M., J. Vickers, and J. Zhou (2009): “Prominence and consumer search,” RAND
Journal of Economics, 40(2), 209–233.
Barrette, E., G. Gowrisankaran, and R. Town (2020): “Countervailing Market Power and
Hospital Competition,” NBER Working Papers 27005, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Betancourt, R., and D. Gautschi (1990): “Demand complementarities, household production,
and retail assortments,” Marketing Science, 9(2), 146–161.
Briesch, R. A., P. K. Chintagunta, and E. J. Fox (2009): “How does assortment affect
grocery store choice?,” Journal of Marketing Research, 46(2), 176–189.
Broniarczyk, S. M., W. D. Hoyer, and L. McAlister (1998): “Consumersâ perceptions of the
assortment offered in a grocery category: The impact of item reduction,” Journal of Marketing
Research, 35(2), 166–176.
Bronnenberg, B. J. (2018): “Innovation and distribution: A general equilibrium model of man-
ufacturing and retailing,” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13058.
Cirik, K., and R. Makadok (2020): “Online Reviews, Market Rivalry, and Pioneer Advantage:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment with Randomized Entry Order in Marijuana Retailing,”
Working Paper.
Corstjens, J., and M. Corstjens (1995): Store Wars: The Battle for Mindspace and Shelfspace.
Wiley Publishing.
Ellickson, P. B. (2007): “Does Sutton apply to supermarkets?,” The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 38(1), 43–59.
Fox, E. J., A. L. Montgomery, and L. M. Lodish (2004): “Consumer shopping and spending
across retail formats,” The Journal of Business, 77(S2), S25–S60.
Goldfarb, A., and M. Xiao (2011): “Who thinks about the competition? Managerial ability and
strategic entry in US local telephone markets,” American Economic Review, 101(7), 3130–61.
Hall, W., D. Stjepanovic, J. Caulkins, M. Lynskey, J. Leung, G. Campbell, and L. De-
genhardt (2019): “Public health implications of legalising the production and sale of cannabis
for medicinal and recreational use,” The Lancet, 394, 1580–1590.
Hansen, B., K. Miller, B. Seo, and C. Weber (2020): “Taxing the Potency of Sin Goods:
Evidence from Recreational Cannabis and Liquor Markets,” National Tax Journal.
37
Hansen, B., K. Miller, and C. Weber (2018): “The Taxation of Recreational Marijuana:
Evidence from Washington State,” Working Paper.
Hitsch, G., A. Hortacsu, and X. Lin (2019): “Prices and Promotions in U.S. Retail Mar-
kets: Evidence from Big Data,” University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics
Working Paper No. 2019-117.
Hoch, S., A. Montgomery, B. Kim, and P. Rossi (1995): “Determinants of Store-Level Price
Elasticity,” Journal of Marketing Research, 32(1).
Hoch, S. J., E. T. Bradlow, and B. Wansink (1999): “The variety of an assortment,” Marketing
Science, 18(4), 527–546.
Hollenbeck, B. (2017): “The Economic Advantages of Chain Affiliation,” RAND Journal of
Economics, 48, 1103–1135.
Hollenbeck, B., and K. Uetake (2019): “Taxation and Market Power in the Legal Marijuana
Industry,” Working Paper.
Holmes, T., and J. Schmitz (1995): “On the Turnover of Business Firms and Business Managers,”
Journal of Political Economy, 103(5), 1005–1038.
Hristakeva, S. (2020): “Vertical Contracts with Endogenous Product Selection: An Empirical
Analysis of Vendor-Allowance Contracts,” Working Paper.
(2021): “Determinants of channel profitability: retailersâ control over product selections
as contracting leverage,” Working Paper.
Hurst, E., and B. Pugsley (2011): “What Do Small Businesses Do?,” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 43(2), 73–142.
Ilanes, G., and S. Moshary (2019): “Market Structure and Product Assortment: Evidence
from a Natural Experiment in Liquor Licensure,” Kilts Center for Marketing at Chicago Booth â
Nielsen Dataset Paper Series 2-013.
Inderst, R., and G. Shaffer (2007): “Retail Mergers, Buyer Power and Product Variety,” The
Economic Journal.
IRS (2019): The Internal Revenue Service Data Book, 2019. Department of the Treasury: Internal
Revenue Service.
Jones, J. B., and S. Pratap (2020): “An Estimated Structural Model of Entrepreneurial Behav-
ior,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Jovanovich, B. (1982): “Selection and the Evolution of Industry,” Econometrica, 50(3), 649–670.
Kim, J., G. M. Allenby, and P. E. Rossi (2002): “Modeling consumer demand for variety,”
Marketing Science, 21(3), 229–250.
Klopack, B. (2018): “One size fits all? The value of standardized retail chains,” working paper.
Kuksov, D., and Y. Lin (2017): “Signaling low margin through assortment,” Management Science,
63(4), 1166–1183.
38
Loertscher, S., and L. M. Marx (2019): “Countervailing Power,” .
Maican, F., and M. Orth (2020): “Entry Regulations and Product Variety in Retail,” Working
Paper.
McAfee, R. P. (1994): “Endogneous Availability, Cartels, and Merger in an Equilibirium Price
Dispersion,” Journal of Economic Theory, 62, 24–47.
Mogilner, C., T. Rudnick, and S. S. Iyengar (2008): “The mere categorization effect: How
the presence of categories increases choosers’ perceptions of assortment variety and outcome
satisfaction,” Journal of Consumer Research, 35(2), 202–215.
Pancras, J., S. Sriram, and V. Kumar (2012): “Empirical investigation of retail expansion and
cannibalization in a dynamic environment,” Management Science, 58(11), 2001–2018.
Pozzi, A., and F. Schivardi (2015): “Entry Regulation in Retail Markets,” CEPR Discussion
Paper, DP10836.
Rao, A. (2020): “Strategic research and development investment decisions in the pharmaceutical
industry,” Marketing Science, 39(3), 564–586.
Rhodes, A. (2015): “Multiproduct Retailing,” Review of Economic Studies, 82(1), 260–390.
Symeonidis, G. (2010): “Downstream merger and welfare in a bilateral oligopoly,” International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 28(3), 230–243.
Taylor, W., and B. Hollenbeck (2020): “Leveraging Loyalty Programs Using Competitor Based
Targeting,” Working Paper.
Thomadsen, R. (2005): “The Effect of Ownership Structure on Prices in Geographically Differ-
entiated Industries,” RAND Journal of Economics, 25, 908–929.
Thomas, D. (2019): “License Quotas and the Inefficient Regulation of Sin Goods: Evidence from
the Washington Recreational Marijuana Market,” Working Paper.
Tyndall, J. (2019): “Getting High and Low Prices: Marijuana Dispensaries and Home Values,”
Real Estate Economics.





The list of businesses that have applied to licenses is available at the Washington State Liquor and
Cannabis Board website.31. This list of licenses is not cumulative as we noticed that some licenses
are dropped from the file through time. To recover the history of all license applications we use
the website wayback machine. It allows us to recover all the listings made available to the public
since the market opened. We use this procedure to recover the list of processors, producers, and
retailers that have ever applied to a license. In 22 instances, firms receive a new license number
but maintain their operation at the same location. We treat these cases as continuously operating
firms.
A.2 Transaction Data
We have two distinct data sets that are put together to form the final transactions data.
• Retail dispensing data: contains all transactions between retailers and consumers with times-
tamp, prices, quantity, product type, strain, and parentid. The parentid variable indicates
a 16 digit barcode identifier of the batch or lot the sample was taken from. It displays the
company making the sale but it does not have the exact license that was responsible for the
sale.
• Inventory transfers data: contains all transactions between the upstream and downstream
markets. Importantly, it displays the information at the license level. Other variables that
are included in this data are: strain, type, quantity, sale price, and parentid.
The parentid variable indicates a 16 digit barcode identifier of the batch or lot the sample was taken
from. This variable is also present in dispensing and allows us to match the datasets above.
A.3 Outliers
As with any administrative data, the data contains a small fraction of errors, misentries, and out-
liers. We systematically delete observations believed to be mis-entered into the BioTrack system.32
Namely, cases where the final sales price is below $3 per gram or above $80 per gram (0.8% of trans-
actions), wholesale prices below $1 or above $30 per gram ( .04% of transactions), weight below .5
grams or above 30 grams .07% of transactions) and markups above 3 ( .04% of transactions).33
A.4 Taxation
We check for whether retailers enter tax-inclusive or pre-tax prices into the dataset. This first
requires collecting sales tax rates for every store in every month because sales taxes may vary at
the 9-digit zip code level. We find the 9-digit zip code of each store and match each store to the
correct sales tax in each month of the data.
31https://data.lcb.wa.gov
32We follow the same procedure as Hollenbeck and Uetake (2019) for the removal of outliers and treatment of
taxes, described below.
33Legal purchase limits are one ounce for usable, 16 ounces for solid, 72 ounces for liquid, and 7 grams for
concentrates.
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Since the majority of final prices use integer units, we check for the share of integers generated
by each possible data entry rule. These rules include entering the pre-tax price, the price with
excise and sales taxes included, and the prices that include either excise or sales taxes alone. Then
at the retailer-month level we choose the rule that generates the highest share of integer prices, in
some cases we also compare pricing within a retailer-category from month to month and checking
final prices against the market average in each month to insure consistent treatment. We find
that prior to the tax change in July 2015, roughly 8% of retailers enter tax-exclusive prices, 60%
enter prices that include excise but not sales taxes, and 25% enter fully tax-inclusive prices. After
the tax law changes, over 90% of retailers enter tax-exclusive prices. Once we recover the rule at
the retailer-month level we construct the correct tax-inclusive and tax-exclusive prices for every
transaction.
A.5 Advertising
We acquired data on retailer advertising from Kantar Media, a firm that tracks advertising spending
across media. They have tracked advertising spending in the cannabis industry since before legal-
ization through the current time for the Seattle and Spokane markets, including outer suburbs. We
observe total spending at the monthly level for each media: outdoor, newspaper, magazines, tele-
vision, radio, and internet display. Advertising in this industry is heavily regulated and restricted,
and consequently there is relatively little of it.34
Table 13: Summary Statistics for Kantar Media Advertising Data
Ad Spending ($) Share
Media
Internet Display 2,094,816 11.5%
Local Magazines 52,922 .3%







We use Kantar Media’s product description, which includes the store name, to match by hand
the advertising data to the main data. Table 13 provides summary information on firm advertising.
Almost all of it takes place in Seattle, broadly defined. Two thirds of all spending is on outdoor
billboards, followed by roughly 20% spent on newspaper ads.
34For instance, all advertising is prohibited “in any manner that would be especially appealing to children or other
persons under 21 years of age.” Advertising within 1000 feet of a school is also prohibited and all advertising must
include a variety of cautionary text. Outdoor billboard advertising is limited to providing the name and location of
a business.
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A.6 Co-branded and Former Medical Stores
The regulation WAC 314-55-155, from May 2016, regulated the advertising in the WA cannabis
industry. Among other rules, it allowed firms to have their own website where an “our story" tab is
usually found. This feature and the wayback machine digital archive allowed us to map the lottery
winners that had experience in the cannabis industry prior to the legalization as collective gardens.
We explore whether stores formerly operating as medical dispensaries prior to I-502 have different
likelihoods of being present in multi-store firms or whether including this as a covariate changes
any of our results. We find that former medical stores have lower sales and profits consistently,
even at the very beginning of the sample when they might have an advantage based on awareness
and reputation. No other results are effected by including this distinction.
The same data features made it possible to identify sets of stores that operate under the same
brand, which might encompass one or more firms. This is because their store locations were listed
on their websites. We find several instances of co-branded stores that are part of separate firms,
meaning they have separate owners and acquired their licenses through separately filed lottery
applications but at some point they chose to align themselves in their marketing. They either share
the same name or have a similar name and list all stores on a joint website.
An empirical concern in treating these as multi-store firms is that these arrangements may be
more likely to be entered into by higher quality managers or they may be more likely for stores
with prime locations. We therefore exclude co-branded but legally distinct sets of stores from our
definition of multi-store.
A.7 Non-Compliance with Lottery Outcomes
While the Washington retail license lottery granted entrepreneurs the right to enter if they won a
license, it did not require them to enter. If a substantial share of firms did not comply with the
lottery it could generate potential bias in our estimates that rely on the lottery for identification.
In particular, if low-quality entrepreneurs who won multiple licenses chose to only enter with one
store instead of multiple stores because they lacked access to capital, had insufficient motivation,
or other reasons, it would decrease the quality of the single-store firm pool and increase the quality
of the multi-store pool.
We therefore investigate the extent of non-compliance and describe it here. We ultimately find
just 11 examples of non-compliers, or firms that won licenses but did not open stores using those
licenses. Details on these firms are shown in Table 14.
Of the 11 retail applications that won licenses, 5 were owned by firms that had filed multiple
applications and 6 had only filed 1 application. Out of all 11, none of them entered using the
store application in question and none of them were awarded any other licenses. This last fact is
reassuring, because it means that no potential multi-store firms we focus our analysis on ultimately
entered under any other retail locations (as single-store firms).
We might infer that these entrepreneurs lacked either the motivation or financing to open a
retail store and therefore they were likely to be lower quality firms in the counterfactual where they
had entered. In this case, the average quality of the set of single-store retailers is higher because of
their non-compliance, making our comparison of multi-store to single-store retailers more favorable
for multi-store retailers. Of course, given that only 11 stores did not enter the extent to which the
results could be affected is limited.
A related issue is that 7 stores who won licenses via the lottery were later rejected by either
the state regulator (the Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Board) or by local governments.
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Table 14: Overview of non-entering lottery winners
Retailer Name License UBI City Lottery Jurisdiction # Apps
Stores Who Opted Out:
Max Market 413411 603354273 Kennewick Kennewick 1
The Higher Class 413825 603356943 Yakima Yakima 1
Josh Locke 415577 603359581 Spanaway Pierce County at Large 1
Buds Forever 413830 603354821 Prosser Benton County at Large 3
Blow “N” Smoke & Glass 414352 603347463 Vancouver Clark County at Large 2
Best Budz 413964 602153506 Marysville Marysville 1
Jeff Mahan 415582 603359569 Rainier Thurston County at Large 2
Purple Haze 414979 603293668 Maple Valley Maple Valley 3
Going Green 415185 603362593 Moxee Yakima County at Large 1
Green Easy Herbals 414848 603357680 Concrete Skagit County at Large 3
Medible Mikes 415556 603362604 Walla Walla Walla Walla 1
Rejected Applications:
The Pot Shop 413387 603351701 Bremerton Bremerton 1
RIU420 415045 603357879 Centralia Centralia 3
The Lid 413671 603353091 Brewster Douglas County at Large 1
Chronics 415292 603397627 Rock Island Douglas County at Large 1
Herb Market 413939 603346937 Shoreline Shoreline 2
Trippy Hippy Company 414943 603361953 Granite Falls Snohomish County at Large 1
Purple Dank 415018 603290913 Tukwila Tukwila 3
These firms passed an initial screening in order to enter the lottery but were rejected after further
scrutiny. The issues included a part-owner with a criminal record and store locations within 1000
feet of a park or school. Similar to non-compliers, we presume that these 7 stores would have been
of lower quality than replacement stores simply because the fact that they were rejected suggests a
poor attention to detail as a signal of managerial quality.
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B Robustness Tests
B.1 Robustness on Lottery
In this section we present a set of robustness checks for the primary results on variable profits. First,
we show in Table 15 tests regarding the random distribution of licenses via the lottery. Conditional
on filing a valid application, the result of the lottery is a uniform draw over all firms. Nevertheless,
sophisticated firms might have strategically chosen markets based on their beliefs about the number
of participants that would enter in each lottery. In this case, these firms would be more likely to
win multiple licenses, albeit in less desirable markets. If this strategic entry were correlated with
managerial quality, as in Goldfarb and Xiao (2011) this could cause endogeneity bias in the main
results.
In Table 15 we show how our main results on profits across stores change if we include a set of
additional variables related to the lottery outcomes. Column 1 shows the baseline result. Column
2 shows results with a dummy indicator for lottery vs non-lottery licenses. Column 3 includes
city fixed effects and shows the effect of including the probability of wining as a covariate, where
probability of winning is calculated as the number of applications filed divided by the number of
licenses available. Column 4 includes the number of applications at the market level directly. In
column (3) we observe that effectively expanding the market definition has little effects on store
profits. In each case we replicate the size and significance of the effect of multi-store firm membership
on store profits.
Next we analyze whether the distribution of licenses allocated in the lottery is significantly
different from a random allocation. While the licenses were distributed according to random draws,
if firms were able to choose markets strategically there might be a non-random relationship between
number of applications and number of licenses won. We therefore test whether the joint distribution
of licenses is significantly different than what might occur if all licenses had the same win probability.
To do so, we calculate the expected number of licenses won if they were distributed from a poisson
process where all applications had an equal probability of winning a license. We use a poisson
parameter λ equal to the overall probability determined by the total number of applications and
licenses.
Table 16 shows the result of row-by-row chi-square goodness-of-fit tests for the joint distribution
of applications and licenses under the assumption of independent poisson draws. For 3 out of 4
rows we cannot reject the null of independent draws with p-values between .3 and .4. For the row
with 3 applications per firm, we do reject independent draws with p = .038. Essentially, among
firms that applied for 3 licenses too few won multiple licenses. Combining all rows, for the sample
as a whole we cannot reject independent draws, however.
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Table 15: Robustness Checks on Lottery
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Multi-Store 35028.8* 35026.5* 40079.8** 39676.3**





# Applications (Lottery) 291.5
(370.781)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes
City FE Yes Yes
IVs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 3255 3255 2173 2173
R2 0.579 0.579 0.583 0.583
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: The dependent variable in each column is variable profits. Data sample period is April 2016 to April
2017. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the store-time level.







1 2 3 χ2 p-value
1 117 0 0
2 60 10 0 1.80 .406
3 76 18 3 6.52 .038
4 26 8 0 .85 .357
5+ 23 10 3 .83 .362
Note: This table shows the joint distribution of applications filed and stores ultimately won in the 2014 retail lottery. We
calculate the expected number of licenses in each bin assuming all applications have an equal probability of winning and
calculate a chi-square goodness-of-fit test independently for each row.
B.2 Store Advertising
In this section we test whether the multi-store profit advantage is attributable to higher levels of
advertising spending. First, we compute monthly ad spending by each store type and find that
multi-store firms do not advertise more basis than single-store firms. Multi-store firms spend $540
per month on ads on average, with a median spending of $0 and a standard deviation of $3238.
Single-store firms spend $734 per month on ads on average, with a median spending of $0 and a
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standard deviation of $2849. The figures for multi-store firms are at the firm level since we cannot
separately measure advertising at the store level.
Table 17 shows the primary results for profits when advertising is included as a covariate. For
multi-store firms we show firm-level advertising and store-level advertising, calculated by dividing
the firm level amount by the number of stores. We also include log(adspendst + 1) due to the
highly skewed nature of the data. In Columns 2-4 of Table 17 we see that advertising is positively
correlated with variable profits, but including this covariate does not weaken the main effects.
Table 17: Robustness of Primary Outcomes to Advertising
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Multi-Store 35028.8* 30758.7* 33678.1** 33859.5**
(13776.509) (13186.297) (12495.708) (12916.125)
Firm Ad Spending 3.51***
(0.862)




# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
IVs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3255 3255 3255 3255
R2 0.579 0.595 0.596 0.606
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: The dependent variable in each column is variable profits. Data sample period is April 2016
to April 2017. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the store-time level.
B.2.1 Entry Timing
Next we explore how the timing of entry by the stores in a multi-store chain effect their partner
firms’ profits. One possible explanation for the profit advantage caused by being in a multi-store
firm is that firms can use the profits generated by their first store to open a larger or higher quality
second or third store, thus generating higher average variable profits.
Table 18 shows the result investigating this mechanism. Column 1 of Table 18 shows that,
among multi-store firms only, stores that enter second or third are not more profitable compared
to the first store opened by that firm. In fact, after conditioning on firm age and time fixed effects,
later entrants are less profitable than first entrants but not statistically significantly so. The lower
profits experience by these stores may be due to a strategic decision to open in more desirable
locations first and less desirable locations later. This rules out a story where the multi-stores are
more profitable per store through a larger investment in fixed costs in second or third stores after
successfully operating one store for some period of time.
Similarly, we compare the effect of being in a multi-store firm on the first entrants in each firm
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Table 18: Timing of Main Effects
(1) (2)
All Multi-Store Firms First Entrants Only
Entry order=2 or 3 2045.5
(32417.701)
# Stores open>1 18943.1
(12338.500)
# Applications FE Yes Yes
Store Age in Months FE Yes Yes
Firm Age in Months FE Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes
Observations 324 209
R2 0.805 0.807
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table shows results for two subsamples of multi-store firms. The dependent variable
in both columns is variable profits. Column 1 shows results for all stores in multi-store firms
and shows the effects of being the 2nd or 3rd entrant on variable profits. Column 2 shows
results only for stores who were the first entrant in a multi-store firm and shows the effects of
the 2nd firm’s entry on the focal stores variable profits.
by using the timing of future store entries. Column 2 of Table 18 uses only first entrant members
of multi-store firms and shows that when the number of stores in the firm goes from 1 to 2, the
profits of the first entrant are higher conditional on age, time and market fixed effects. Again, the
result is not statistically significant due to the small sample size. This is suggestive that the profits
of the first entrant may increase after the second entrant opens, although we note that this could
also be the result of reverse causality if the firm owner waits to open the second store until when
they anticipate the first store becoming more profitable.35
B.2.2 Competition and Market Definition
Next we present two robustness checks related to local competition faced by each retailer. To do
so, we collect data on the geographic distances between all retailers in the state. We use these to
define a more granular definition of competition. We begin by drawing radii around each retailer
of distances 1 mile, 5 miles, and 10 miles. For each firm and each radii we find the identities of all
competing retailers falling into the given radius. We then aggregate these lists of firms and calculate
their intersections to define local markets around each store each month. Next, we compute the
number of competitors active in each radius in each time period. We then include this number as
a covariate to control for the local competition faced by each firm each period.36
Results are shown in Table 19. We find that having more competitors nearby is associated
with lower variable profit, as we would expect. When these measures are included the main effect is
largely unaffected. This is likely because there is not a clear reason to believe that stores belonging to
35A similar result is found in Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar (2012).
36An alternative way to handle competition would be to use data on customer location and define competition
based on to what extent customers were located near competitors, as in Taylor and Hollenbeck (2020), but customer
data is not available in this context.
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Table 19: Robustness Checks on Competitors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Profits Variable Profits Variable Profits Variable Profits
Multi-Store 35028.8* 35306.7* 35211.7* 33148.8*
(13776.509) (14032.037) (13878.767) (13936.822)
# Firms: 1m Radius -55.6
(63.538)
# Firms: 5m Radius 20.8
(14.750)
# Firms: 10m Radius -109.3***
(15.495)
Observations 3255 3255 3255 3255
R2 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.016
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
multi-store firms and stores operating independently would face different local levels of competition
given that the treatment in this case is generated randomly.
Similarly, we can test the robustness of our results to different market definitions using these
radius-based markets. We show results in Table 20. When we use market fixed effects based on the
intersection of local radii around each retailer, we find results that are broadly consistent with the
standard market fixed effects. For the 1 mile radius we find similar effects of being a member of a
multi-store chain on variable profits. For the 5 and 10 mile radius markets we find smaller effects
but still find a substantial profit advantage.
B.2.3 Assortment and Profits
In the main results and product-level results we do not control for differences in store assortment.
In principle, if multi-store firms stocked a smaller variety this could show up mechanically as larger
differences in units sold across store-types and thus variable profits. Table 21 shows results for
product-level variable profits. Column 1 shows the main result from the paper, column 2 shows
how results vary without product FE. The variable profits are slightly higher without product
FE, indicating multi-store firms are carrying products with higher profit margins on average and
including product FE is needed to remove any bias this may cause. Columns 3 and 4 include
assortment controls using the number of brands sold in a store and the number of unique products
sold. In both cases the difference in variable profits is amplified by inclusion of these controls.
Table 22 shows the same set of comparison for units sold and we find similar patterns across each
specification.
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Table 20: Robustness Checks on Market Definition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
County Markets 1 mile Radius 5 mile Radius 10 mile Radius
Multi-Store 35028.8* 32256.2*** 22606.3*** 23071.7***
(13776.509) (6122.112) (6040.185) (6138.207)
# Applications FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age in Months FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
IVs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3255 3332 3332 3332
R2 0.010 0.188 0.172 0.134
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: This table compares the main results using different definitions of market. Column 1 presents results using
county-level markets. Columns 2-4 use markets constructed by calculating the set of firms within a certain distance
of each other and then taking the intersection of these sets around each retailer to form market definitions. The
distance radius used for each is noted in the column header.
Table 21: Profit Results Controlling for Assortment Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Profit Variable Profit Variable Profit Variable Profit
Multi-store 154.1*** 171.0*** 225.9*** 172.8***
(36.183) (37.496) (37.480) (37.498)
# Brands Sold -12.9***
(0.490)
# Products Sold 0.24***
(0.064)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes
Observations 173618 173636 173636 173636
R2 0.231 0.136 0.139 0.136
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 22: Sales Units Results Controlling for Assortment Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Units sold Units sold Units sold Units sold
Multi-store 54.1*** 56.9*** 69.3*** 58.1***
(11.654) (11.894) (11.901) (11.893)
# Brands Sold -2.89***
(0.156)
# Products Sold 0.16***
(0.020)
# Applications Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product FE Yes
Observations 173618 173636 173636 173636
R2 0.201 0.128 0.130 0.129
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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